
Chapter 16: Confinement Problem

- What is the problem?
- Isolation: virtual machines, sandboxes
- Detecting covert channels
- Analyzing covert channels
- Mitigating covert channels

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



Example Problem


- Server balances bank accounts for clients
- Server security issues:
 - Record correctly who used it
 - Send only balancing info to client
- Client security issues:
 - Log use correctly
 - Do not save or retransmit data client sends


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
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
















Kocher's Attack

```
This computes x = a<sup>z</sup> mod n, where z = z<sub>0</sub> ... z<sub>k-1</sub>
x := 1; atmp := a;
for i := 0 to k-1 do begin
if z<sub>i</sub> = 1 then
x := (x * atmp) mod n;
atmp := (atmp * atmp) mod n;
end
result := x;
Length of run time related to number of 1 bits in z
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```




Virtual Machine (VM)

- A program that simulates hardware of computer system
- *Virtual machine monitor* (VMM) provides VM on which conventional OS can run
 - Each VM is one subject; VMM knows nothing about processes running on each VM
 - VMM mediates all interactions of VM with resources, other VMS
 - Satisfies rule of transitive closure

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


DEC VAX VMM

- VMM is security kernel
 - Can run Ultrix OS or VMS OS
- Invoked on trap to execute privileged instruction
 - Only VMM can access hardware directly
 - VM kernel, executive levels both mapped into physical executive level
- VMM subjects: users, VMs
 - Each VM has own disk areas, file systems
 - Each subject, object has multilevel security, integrity labels

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
Example: Limiting Execution

• Sidewinder


- Uses type enforcement to confine processes
- Sandbox built into kernel; site cannot alter it
- Java VM
 - Restricts set of files that applet can access and hosts to which applet can connect
- DTE, type enforcement mechanism for DTEL
 - Kernel modifications enable system administrators to configure sandboxes

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
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



Janus Configuration File





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





















Goal Symbol Tree Nodes

- Modification: attribute modified
- Recognition: attribute modification detected
- Direct recognition: subject can detect attribute modification by referencing attribute directly or calling function that returns it
- Inferred recognition: subject can detect attribute modification without direct reference
- Inferred-via: info passed from one attribute to another via specified primitive (e.g. syscall)
- Recognized-new-state: modified attribute specified by inferred-via goal

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<section-header><section-header>
 Other Tree Nodes
 Operation symbol represents primitive operation
 Failure symbol indicates information cannot be sent along path
 And symbol reached when for all children
 Child is operation; and
 If child goal, then goal is reached
 Or symbol reached when for any child:

 Child is operation; or
 If child goal, then goal is reached

Constructing Tree


- Example: files in file system have 3 attributes
 - *locked*: true when file locked
 - *isopen*: true when file opened
 - inuse: set containing PID of processes having file open
- Functions:
 - read_access(p, f): true if p has read rights over file f
 - *empty*(*s*): true if set *s* is empty
 - random: returns one of its arguments chosen at random


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
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
Locking and Opening Routines (* lock the file if it is not locked and not opened *) (* open the file if it isn't locked and the process has the right to read the file procedure Lockfile(f: file); *) procedure Openfile(f: file); begin if not f.locked and empty(f.inuse) begin then if not f.locked and read_access(process_id, f) then f.locked := true: (* add process ID to inuse set *) end: f.inuse = f.inuse + process_id; (* unlock the file *) procedure Unlockfile(f: file); end; (* if the process can read the file, say if the file is open, otherwise return a value at random *) begin if f.locked then f.locked := false; function Fileopened(f: file): boolean; end: begin (* say whether the file is locked *) if not read_access(process_id, f) then function Filelocked(f: file): boolean; Fileopened := random(true, false); begin else Filelocked := f.locked; Fileopened := not isempty(f.inuse); end: end November 1, 2004 Introduction to Computer Security Slide #16-32 ©2004 Matt Bishop


	Lockfile	Unlockfile	Filelocked	Openfile	Fileopened
reference	locked, inuse	locked	locked	locked, inuse	inuse
modify	locked	locked	Ø	inuse	Ø
return	Ø	Ø	locked	Ø	inuse
Ø mea	ns no attri	bute affecte	d in specif	ied manne	er






























Covert Timing Channel

- High process can control rate at which pump sends it messages
- Initialization: Low sends messages to pump until communications buffer full
 - Low gets ACK for each message put into the buffer; no ACK for messages when communications buffer full
- Protocol: sequence of trials; for each trial
 - High sends a 1 by reading a message
 - Then Low gets ACK when it sends another message
 - High sends a 0 by not reading a message

Then Low doesn't gets ACK when it sends another message
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- Case 2: Low process sends messages faster than High process can remove them
 - Maximizes performance
 - Opens covert channel
- Case 3: Pump, processes handle messages at same rate
 - Decreases bandwidth of covert channel, increases performance
 - Opens covert channel, sub-optimal performance

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