
SNMP overview

Network Mgmt/Sec.


Outline

- ◆ snmp components
 - architecture/MIBS/naming
 - protocol
 - security
- ◆ snmp history and versions
- ◆ summary

snmp elements

- ◆ client/server - architecture
- ◆ database elements (MIB)
 - ASN.1
 - naming
 - it's the contents JIM (too)
- ◆ protocol
- ◆ security (or lack therein)

e.g., SNMP approach




manager polls all nodes (send/response) with
SNMP/displays data

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architecture

- ◆ in general
- ◆ **manager** requests individual data items
 - in v2 tables, in v1 table elements 1 at a time
- ◆ from **agent**
- ◆ **manager** is client/client-server sense
- ◆ **agent** consists of MIB database + snmp code to respond to manager, server (serves database)


manager/agent



proxy agent possible but rare

- ◆ proxy agent
- ◆ speaks SNMP to manager
- ◆ but “MIB” does not exist
- ◆ instead agent might speak another protocol entirely out the other side
 - level of indirection
- ◆ proxies for MIB capability
- ◆ might use RPC to talk out other end

proxy agent



database elements

- ◆ agent has 1 or more sets of variables
- ◆ grouped in MIB
- ◆ MIB - management information base
- ◆ MIB is in some sense a formal specification
 - in ASCII and a parseable grammar
- ◆ basically just variables with naming mechanism plus values
- ◆ variables are typed and grouped in data structure

MIB, more

- ◆ the language for encoding MIB variables is called
- ◆ **ASN.1 - Abstract Syntax Notation**
- ◆ “Pascal-like” data description language
- ◆ basic and structured types
- ◆ variables consist of (name, value) and a type (e.g., *displayString*)
- ◆ types usually ints, strings, addresses, arrays

MIB, more

- ◆ simple example of MIB values might include
- ◆ system MIB vars as (type,name,value):
 - DisplayString sysDescr (“cisco 2924”)
 - TimeTicks sysUpTime (“up since yesterday”)
 - DisplayString sysContact (“Charlie S.”)
 - INTEGER sysServices (“internet layer (router)”)

MIB does not mean “Men In Black”

- ◆ can include more complex values including
- ◆ tables (2-dimensional scalars)
 - ip routing table
 - arp table
 - list of interfaces with associated ip addresses, netmasks
 - tcp connections that are open

a MIB by any other name

- ◆ the miracle is the naming mechanism
 - a **COMPLEX** miracle ...
- ◆ borrowed from ISO/OSI protocol suite
- ◆ applies both to SNMP PDU and data
 - in ISO ASN.1 was used to describe all packet elements too, e.g., CLNP
- ◆ attributes include:
 - **lexicographical ordering**; i.e., if you know the predecessor, you can always get the next value
 - and you always know a predecessor therefore


magical MIB marvels

- ◆ any manager can always find any or all of a MIB
- ◆ without a priori knowing its elements, or table size (how big it is)
- ◆ **you can walk all of it a priori**
- ◆ this is due to the basic **tree structure** of all MIB data

a MIB data item

- ◆ is called or named by its associated
- ◆ **Object Identifier** or *OID*
- ◆ fundamental base type
- ◆ universal prefix is:
- ◆ internet OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1),
org(3), dod(6), internet(1)}
- ◆ 1.3.6.1 (iso.org.dod.internet)
- ◆ note associated string labels (but the numbers are
used in the protocol)

top part of OID tree



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important SNMP variables live in:

- ◆ 1. **MIB-2** subtree
- ◆ prefix: **1.3.6.1.2.1**
 - 1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1 (system.sysDescr)}
- ◆ 2. **private/enterprises** subtree
 - for proprietary MIB values
 - e.g., Cisco Mibs quite extensive
 - **1.3.6.1.4.1** (enterprises is last prefix)

so remember these two:

◆ **MIB-2: 1.3.6.1.2.1**

– {iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib-2}

◆ **enterprise: 1.3.6.1.4.1**

– {iso.org.dod.internet.private.enterprises}

system.sysDescr

1 .3. 6. 1. 2. 1. 1. 1

iso.org.dod.internet.mgmt.mib2.system.sysDescr

sw note: depending on manager, possible that rooted OID starts with 1 or .1. read the documentation.

MIB-2(1) subtree

system (1)

interfaces(2)

at(3)

ip(4)

icmp(5)

tcp(6)

udp(7)

egp(8)

transmission(10) { specific link types }

snmp(11)

and more (bridge/ethernet stats, repeaters/UPS)

some enterprise MIB values

- ◆ from Cisco-land
- ◆ environmental mib can contain temperatures!
- ◆ router may provide load average
- ◆ big switch may have traffic meter (how much is backplane utilized)
- ◆ CDP values and VLAN values in MIBS
- ◆ although not totally related, Cisco has so-called community-based VLAN indexing
 - allows per VLAN bridge/STP information

protocol

- ◆ on top of UDP
- ◆ manager “probes” agent (sends request),
 - gets back result (send/receive)
- ◆ SNMP v1 defines 5 message types
 - **get**, and **get-next** (reads)
 - **set** (write)
 - **response** (ACK if set, or value if get)
 - **trap**

traps

- ◆ asynchronously sent by agent to manager
- ◆ most important type is linkDown - interface crashed (e.g., router interface)
- ◆ common to have linkDown caught by some manager as part of trap/event analysis
 - HPOV can do this, or net-snmp trapd can be setup to do this
 - send page to network manager (human being)


SNMPv1 trap types include:

- coldStart(0) - unexpected restart(crash)
- warmStart(1) - soft reboot
- linkDown(2) - if down, the most imprint!
- linkUp(3) - the opposite of linkDown
- (snmp) authenticationFailure(4)
- egpNeighborLoss(5)
- enterpriseSpecific(6) - proprietary with sub-code
 - » Cisco has lots of these

get and get-next

- ◆ get specifies a single variable by name; e.g.,
- ◆ system.sysDescr
 - get at ip X, OID=1.3.6.1.2.1.1.1
 - response returns value “cisco 5505”
- ◆ get-next specifies OID, but value returned is next lexicographic OID and its value
- ◆ **thus get-next can be used to query the entire tree, get tables, heal the sick, etc.**

the amazing get-next



get-next sysDescr, and you get sysObjectId
get-next sysObjectId and get sysUpTime
get-next sysServices and get what?

security (bwaa-ha-ha)

- ◆ starting point: security is poor
- ◆ SNMPv1 relies on “passwords in the clear”
like telnet/ftp/pop, etc.
- ◆ OID objects have attributes, include
 - readonly
 - read/write
 - write-only (never mind)
 - not implemented (at least be honest)

in practice,

- ◆ SNMPv1 agent has a set of community strings (passwords applied to a set of agents)
- ◆ these must be supplied with get/set requests, etc (traps too) from manager/agent
- ◆ traps are the other way of course, agent to manager
- ◆ SET of 1 or more strings for readonly/read-write request
- ◆ if PDU/packet community string matches, value


universal community strings

- ◆ readonly - *public* (common default)
- ◆ readwrite - *private* (default)
- ◆ usually applies to ENTIRE SET OF MIBS at agent
- ◆ authentication-only service in SNMPv1, i.e., no privacy (no encryption)

security constraints

- ◆ typically imposed by border router access-lists
- ◆ may block all but given ip address from talking to it
- ◆ assume can't send snmp requests from WAN/Internet into site (make that so)

picture of possible SNMP security setup



common-practice (v1 continued)

- ◆ by very wary of snmp “writes” - may disallow them entirely
- ◆ do not allow any snmp from outside world-in
- ◆ worry about “interior lines”, make sure manager is close to agents so that promiscuous mode sniffing cannot occur
 - with some routers/switches can start to use ssh
- ◆ **you NEVER know what might be in a MIB and settable** (catch fire on command)

Jim Binkley could be buggy too

snmp writes may be unavoidable

- ◆ some tools may assume snmp writes ok
- ◆ cisco ciscoview, rmon probe config
- ◆ if you want to use these tools, must design network for secure access
- ◆ if hacker could break into probe, can use built-in sniffer
- ◆ hacker could manipulate vlans in switches (too awful to think about)

network snmp write design


Inet - can't get to net 1
↓



router uses ACL to
block access to net 1

net 2
Inet
access
exists

net 1, use vlans to group
switches here



dual-homed console

SNMP-short history

- ◆ late 80's, early 90's presumed by IETF that ISO would win out in protocol stack race
- ◆ thus SNMP was viewed as temporary compromise
- ◆ but was oddly based on ISO mechanisms (ASN.1 ...) (not necessarily a bad thing)
- ◆ ISO didn't happen and SNMP crushed its ISO competition

SNMP versions

- ◆ v1 - widely implemented
 - many new RFCs added for mib-2 new variables sets associated with new network entities
 - RMON added for more instrumentation (especially on ethernet)
 - RMON-2 added as RMON-1 ethernet only, RMON-2 added network/transport-layer stats

v2 (aka v2c)

- ◆ v2 was supposed to add better security
- ◆ and some optimizations
- ◆ security modifications were good, and ahead of their time BUT
- ◆ IETF wg couldn't agree, security ideas were not standardized
- ◆ all that remained of v2 practically was
 - **get-bulk** (get a table in one go)
 - **64 bit integers** used for some counters

v3

- ◆ focus is on security (crypto wrappers)
 - and finer grain access control to MIBS
- ◆ packets may be authenticated and/or encrypted
- ◆ view as authentication wrapper on v2/v1 pkt
- ◆ simple session-key (change of key) exists
- ◆ big ticket item: **writes may be made secure**
- ◆ one may still disallow snmp across net
 - basic security policy: just say no ...

rmon

- ◆ remote monitoring (more real-time)
 - includes real-time promiscuous based ethernet sampling/threshold mgmt/packet sniffing/topn
- ◆ rmon I (layer 2)
 - ethernet/link-layer stats only
 - e.g., top N talkers src/dest
- ◆ rmon II (layer 3/4)
 - includes IP addr/tcp&&udp port stats

rmon statement:

- ◆ hint to jim: say something about rmon probes/expense/functionality
- ◆ functionality:
 - layer 2 stats collected over short time snapshots
 - layer 3 stats the same
 - host 1 by host 2 traffic flow information
 - thresholds - event on too much/too little X
 - promiscuous mode sniffing

summary

- ◆ snmp consists of
 - grammar (ASN) for defining data
 - variables (MIBS) associated with device
 - » standard, optional, and enterprise-specific
 - » depends on the device though (hub/printer/router)
 - UDP-based L7 protocol including get-next, and trap
 - naming convention (OID/tree) that allows
 - » lexicographic walk - you may but do not need to know variables names ahead of time (or number)
- ◆ security bad in v1, v3 to “fix”, v2c may be norm

more summary

- ◆ **manager** is client in client-server sense
- ◆ **agent** (or proxy) is server (where the MIBS are)
- ◆ manager **polls** (usually periodically as with HPOV, MRTG, or by hand as with ucd-snmp snmpwalk or HPOV mib browser)
agents
 - displays data

some common tools

- ◆ HPOV
 - ip map and built-in mib browser
- ◆ MRTG/rrdtool/Cricket and friends
 - periodic graphing of snmp elements
- ◆ ucd-snmp, now net-snmp (command shell utilities)
 - snmpget, snmpset, snmpwalk
 - note HPOV supplied version similar but different in terms of command-line options