Lecture 1: Overview

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Course Mechanics

- Course web page:
- Contains:
  - Instructor contact information
  - Term paper handout
  - Grading guidelines
  - Topics and Reading Assignments for each lecture
  - Links to lecture notes

Texts

- Anderson
  - Sometimes anecdotal; a good read
  - Second edition (1/2008) is significant revision
  - Parts are available on-line for free (all of first ed)
- Original materials linked on web page
  - Some materials in the ACM library are only accessible when using a PSU IP address (license is based on internet address)
- Supplemental: Bishop (formerly required)
  - Encyclopedic; sometimes dry

Grading

- Midterm: 100 points
- Final: 100 points
- Term paper title, abstract, outline and annotated bibliography: 50 points
- Term paper: 100 points
- Quizzes, Discussion and Class participation: 50 points
  - There will be at least one summarize, outline, and evaluate impact assignment
  - These mechanisms will be used primarily to evaluate mastery of the reading assignments

Academic Integrity

- Be truthful
- Always hand in your own work
- Never present the work of others as your own
- Give proper credit to sources
- Present your data accurately
- Violations of academic integrity will be taken very seriously. Grade of 0 on the assignment. Reported to the university in a manner consistent with university policy.

Term Paper

- Select a topic of your choice on computer security
- Explore:
  - Problem space
  - Solution space
- Identify original sources
- Integrate knowledge; organize; critique
Term Paper

- Midterm:
  - Title
  - Abstract (short description of paper)
  - Outline (identifies structure of paper)
  - Annotated bibliography
    - Author
    - Title
    - Complete bibliographic reference
    - Short description of contribution of paper in your own words

Term Paper

- Due at beginning of last class
  - Final paper
  - 10 - 15 pages (no more than 20!)
  - Paper should have a proper bibliography, references, and should be presented in a manner similar to papers appearing in conferences
  - Paper is not expected to present original research results, but is to be written in your own words and represent what you believe based on your study of the literature

Plagiarism

- Copying text or presenting ideas without attribution is plagiarism
- Plagiarism is a violation of academic integrity
- If you commit plagiarism you will get a grade of 0 and be reported to the university
- I know how to use google
- I will accept no excuses
- There will be no second chances

Exams

- Midterm will cover first half of the class
  - Probably similar to past mid-terms (I will prepare it)
  - Blue book exam
  - I have collected past exam questions and study questions into a "guide" organized by lecture topic
  - Please consult these for continuous self-assessment and midterm exam preparation
- Final will cover second half of the class
  - The final will be prepared by Professor Binkley
  - It will not be a blue book exam

Readings

- Reading assignments are on the web page
- Please come to class prepared to discuss the readings
  - You will learn more
  - The person sitting next to you will learn more
- I may institute pop quizzes at any time to evaluate your preparation for class

Class Mailing List

- Please sign up for the class mailing list
Last Sunday’s NY Times

• A Code for Chaos
  – By JOHN MARKOFF
  – IN June, a Belarus-based computer security firm identified a new computer malware program, Stuxnet, which was repeatedly crashing the computers of one of its clients. Then, last month, a German security researcher suggested that the program’s real target might be the Iranian nuclear program — and that clues in the coding suggested that Israel was the creator.

Since then, there has been growing alarm about the worm, as its target and sophistication have become more apparent. The code has appeared in many countries, notably China, India, Indonesia and Iran. It appears designed to attack a certain type of Siemens industrial control computer, used widely to manage oil pipelines, electrical power grids and many kinds of nuclear plants. The question is: Just how dangerous has this worm and cyberwarfare become?

Other perspectives

• Bruce Schneier
  – Schneier on Security blog; September 22, 2010, "the Stuxnet Worm"
  – It’s impressive:
    – The Stuxnet worm is a “groundbreaking" piece of malware so devious in its use of unpatched vulnerabilities, so sophisticated in its multipronged approach, that the security researchers who tore it apart believe it was the work of state-backed professionals.
    – “It's amazing, really, the resources that went into this worm,” said Liam O'Murchu, manager of operations with Symantec's security response team.
    – “I'd call it groundbreaking,” said Roel Schouwenberg, a senior antivirus researcher at Kaspersky Lab. In comparison, other notable attacks, like the one dubbed Aurora that hacked Google's network and those of dozens of other major companies, were child's play.

Schneier continues:

• EDITED TO ADD (9/22): an interesting theory:
  – By August, researchers had found something more disturbing: Stuxnet appeared to be able to take control of the automated factory control systems it had infected – and do whatever it was programmed to do with them. That was mischievous and dangerous.
  – But it gets worse. Since reverse engineering chunks of Stuxnet's massive code, senior US cyber security experts confirm what Mr. Langner, the German researcher, told the Monitor: Stuxnet is essentially a precision, military-grade cyber missile deployed early last year to seek out and destroy one real-world target of high importance – a target still unknown.
  – The article speculates that the target is Iran's Bushehr nuclear power plant, but there's not much in the way of actual evidence to support that.

Findings from the Field blog

• Stuxnet Target Speculations
  – Stuxnet is the biggest thing to hit industrial control system security since Maroochy. It is unfortunate that it took Ralph Langner’s “complete speculation” to get the attention of the press, and now various media are reporting nonsense like:
    – “Security experts now believe that Stuxnet was built to specifically target Iran's Bushehr nuclear reactor...”
    – “This amazing new example of malware that hits industrial plants is one story, but a search and destroy cyber weapon meant to hit a single target — Iran’s Bushehr reactor...”
  – What control systems security experts agree on is that the intent behind Stuxnet was sabotage. Beyond this, there is only speculation. There is no compelling evidence a nation-state military authored the worm. There is no compelling evidence the Iranian reactor or Iranian uranium processing facilities were the target of the worm. This is all speculation based on circumstantial evidence.
  – http://findingsfromthefield.com/?p=591

Other sources

Computing and Society

- There is a consensus that stuxnet is serious and very specific in its target
- There is concern that information in the mass media freely combines facts and speculation
- However, this is a newsworthy worm, and it wasn’t covered until the speculation got juicy

SCADA: Not just a computer

- Stuxnet targets Siemens Programmable Logic Controllers, an industrial control computer “widely used in ... industrial plants and factories to regulate and operate machinery.”
- Example of a “Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition” (SCADA) system
  - Dams; Power plants; Reactors; Power grid

SCADA evolved dangerously

- Initially assumed physical security of plant, no communication
- Programmed by domain engineers (not security engineers or computer scientists)
- Low level programming on vulnerable platforms
- Then:
  - add a modem (attack by phone)
  - replace a computer and accidentally add a wireless network (drive-by attack by wireless)
  - connect to the internet (attack from home!)

Stuxnet raises stakes

- Launched in January 2009
- Creates a carrier infection on PC’s using exploits in MS operating systems
- Jumps to the SCADA system by infecting a memory stick
- September 2010 hits popular press

Stuxnet

- Information warfare can create physical hazards, not “just” blue screens of death and user inconvenience
- What are the reasonable expectations of society about the state of our information infrastructure? Are we meeting those expectations as a discipline?

Objectives

- Discuss the scope of Computer Security
- Introduce a vocabulary to discuss security
- Sketch the course
CS as Engineering

- Is Computer Science, or Computer Security, an engineering discipline?
- What is Engineering?

Engineering (Wikipedia)

Engineering is the discipline and profession of applying technical and scientific knowledge and utilizing natural laws and physical resources in order to design and implement materials, structures, machines, devices, systems, and processes that realize a desired objective and meet specified criteria. The American Engineers' Council for Professional Development (ECPD, the predecessor of ABET[1]) has defined engineering as follows:

"[T]he creative application of scientific principles to design or develop structures, machines, apparatus, or manufacturing processes, or works utilizing them singly or in combination; or to construct or operate the same with full cognizance of their design; or to forecast their behavior under specific operating conditions; all as respects an intended function, economics of operation and safety to life and property."[2][3][4]

CS as Engineering

- Are we meeting the reasonable expectations of society to
  - Appropriately apply relevant science to the construction of artifacts
  - forecast their behavior under specific operating conditions

Case Study

- Voting
- Do electronic voting machines meet the reasonable expectations of society to provide a technology that is trustworthy and cost effective?

Trustworthy: Worthy of confidence; dependable [Webster’s on-line]

NY Times, January 2008:

“The 2000 election illustrated the cardinal rule of voting systems: if they produce ambiguous results, they are doomed to suspicion. The election is never settled in the mind of the public. To this date, many Gore supporters refuse to accept the legitimacy of George W. Bush’s presidency; and by ultimately deciding the 2000 presidential election, the Supreme Court was pilloried for appearing overly partisan.”

Reaction to 2000 election

- Help America Vote Act (HAVA) of 2002
  - $3.9 billion for new technology
  - “Computers seemed like the perfect answer to the hanging chad.
  - Touch-screen machines would be clear and legible, ...
  - The results could be tabulated very quickly ...
  - And best of all, the vote totals would be conclusive...
  - (Touch-screen machines were also promoted as a way to allow the blind or paralyzed to vote ... HAVA required each poll station to have at least one “accessible” machine.)
Touch Screen Voting Today

• Computers have not solved the problem
• There is still a crisis of confidence in voting

New Jersey

• In February 2008, New Jersey used Sequoia voting machines in their primary election
• Election officials noted anomalies

New Jersey election tape, February 2008, source: Freedom to Tinker blog

57+3+1+1+204 = 266
1 + 11 + 9 + 1 = 22

Several incidents

• The web site http://citp.princeton.edu/ njvotingdocuments/ includes nine tapes from Union County New Jersey (and now several other counties)
• Union County election officials solicited the help of Ed Felten’s lab at Princeton

Sequoia’s Response

Sender: Smith, Ed [address redacted]@sequoiavote.com
To: felten@cs.princeton.edu, appel@princeton.edu
Subject: Sequoia Advantage voting machines from New Jersey
Date: Fri, Mar 14, 2008 at 6:16 PM

Dear Professors Felten and Appel:

As you have likely read in the news media, certain New Jersey election officials have stated that they plan to send to you one or more Sequoia Advantage voting machines for analysis. I want to make you aware that if the County does so, it violates their established Sequoia licensing Agreement for use of the voting system. Sequoia has also retained counsel to stop any infringement of our intellectual properties, including any non-compliant analysis. We will also take appropriate steps to protect against any publication of Sequoia software, its behavior, reports regarding same or any other infringement of our intellectual property.

Very truly yours,
Edwin Smith
VP, Compliance/Quality/Certification
Sequoia Voting Systems
[contact information and boilerplate redacted]

Princeton gains access

• Law suit originally filed in 2004 was brought to trial in 2008
• Trial judge ordered machines be made available to Princeton affiliated expert witnesses (Appel et al.)
• Machines were studied in July and August 2008
• Findings released October 17, 2008
  http://citp.princeton.edu/voting/advantage/
Why?

"THE QUESTION, OF COURSE, is whether the machines should be trusted to record votes accurately. Ed Felten doesn't think so. Felten is a computer scientist at Princeton University, and he has become famous for analyzing — and criticizing — touch-screen machines. In fact, the first serious critics of the machines — beginning 10 years ago — were computer scientists." [NY Times; January 2008]

Why? (cont)

"One might expect computer scientists to be fans of computer-based vote-counting devices, but it turns out that the more you know about computers, the more likely you are to be terrified that they're running elections." [NY Times; January 2008]

Leading Critics

- David Dill, Stanford: http://www.verifiedvotingfoundation.org/
- Matt Bishop, UC Davis http://evote.cs.ucdavis.edu/
- Ed Felten http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/

Expectations of Voting

- Vote is by secret ballot
- The vote should be correctly tallied; all votes cast should be counted in the election
- Every eligible voter who presents themselves at the polling place should be able to vote

Security or Computer Security?

- Are the expectations of integrity, confidentiality, and availability specific to computers?
- Can the properties of the computer system be considered independently of its use?
- Can a voting machine be secure if the voting process is corrupt?
- Ultimately, security is an end-to-end concern [Note Anderson section 1.7]

Voting: Policies and Mechanisms

- Who can vote?
  - Legal requirements for eligibility
    - Must be a citizen residing in the precinct
  - Administrative requirements to register to vote
    - Fill out an application
    - Present evidence of residence (can be by mail or fax)
Voting Mechanisms

- Paper ballot in a ballot box (or mail)  
  – May be implemented as a scan form
- Punch cards
- Mechanical voting machines
- Direct Recording Electronic
- Voter-verifiable paper audit trail

Evaluating mechanisms

- How do we evaluate these options?
- Evaluation must be relevant to a threat model

Voting threat models

- Correlating ballot with voter
- Ballot stuffing
- Casting multiple votes
- Losing ballot boxes
- Ballot modification
- Incorrect reporting of results
- Denial of access to polls
- Vandalism
- Physical intimidation

Felten’s paper

- Security Analysis of the Diebold AccuVote-TS Voting Machine
  – Felton’s team injected malware in a voting machine that could alter the outcome of an election or disable a voting machine during an election
  – Malware was spread by sharing memory cards

Goals of the class:

- Provide a vocabulary to discuss issues relevant to the trustworthiness of systems that include computers
- Provide a set of models and design rules to assist in building and assessing trustworthy systems
- Introduce mechanisms that, when used correctly, can increase trust (e.g. crypto, access control)
- Survey common exploitable vulnerabilities (stack attacks, malware, bots)

Video

- [http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/videos.html](http://itpolicy.princeton.edu/voting/videos.html)
Facets of Security

- Confidentiality
  - Keeping secrets
- Integrity
  - Users trust the system
- Availability
  - The system must be ready when needed

Confidentiality

- Concealment of information or resources
- Government/Military: "Need to Know"
- Mechanisms:
  - Access Control

Integrity

- Trustworthiness of data or resources
- Data Integrity
  - Integrity of content (the vote tallies add up)
- Origin Integrity
  - Source of data is known (each vote was cast by a voter)
- Mechanisms
  - Prevention: block unauthorized changes
  - Detection: analyze data to verify expected properties (e.g. file system consistency check)

Availability

- If an adversary can cause information or resources to become unavailable they have compromised system security
- Denial of Service attacks compromise Availability

Trust

- Every time I drive I trust the brake system on my car
- Before I drive, I do not systematically check the brake system in any way
  - The brake system is a "trusted component" of my car
    - The safety of my operation of the car assumes the brake system is functioning correctly
  - In contrast, I inspect the brakes on my bicycle before I ride and typically test them before I go down a hill

Trustworthy

- Are the brakes on my car "trustworthy"?
  - I.e. is that trust justified?
  - Car is well maintained
  - Brake system "idiot light" is off
  - Brake system hydraulics meet modern standards for redundancy and independence
  - Independent "emergency brake" system is available if primary braking system fails
Trustworthy

- What about my bike brakes?
  - Bike is also well maintained
  - Front and Rear brake systems are independent
  - Simplicity of system affords reduction of "trust base" (the set of "trusted components" that I assume to work) to cables, rims, brake calipers, and pads (and structural integrity of bike, tires)

Threat environment

- Threats to my brakes:
  - Normal wear
  - Extraordinary wear due to maladjustment
  - Manufacturing defect
  - Corrosion and rust
  - Loss of integrity of other components
- How are these threats mitigated?

Malicious threats

- What if I'm worried about sabotage?

Prioritizing Threats

- "Security engineers ... need to be able to put risks and threats in context, make realistic assessments of what might go wrong, and give our clients good advice. That depends on a wide understanding of what worked, what their consequences were, and how they were stopped (if it was worthwhile to do so)."
  
  Ross Anderson, Section 1.2

Definitions

- Trust: a relationship, typically with respect to a property
  - I trust the brake cables on my bike
  - My integrity depends upon the integrity of my bike brakes
  - The fact that I trust something does not make it trustworthy!
- Trusted component: one whose failure can break the property (security policy)
  - Frame, wheelset, cables, tires, brake mechanism

Definitions

- Trustworthy: an attribute of an object
  - Is the object worthy of trust?
Definitions

- Trusted Base: A set of components that are trusted as an assumption
- Trusted Computing Base (TCB): the set of components in a computer system (including hardware and software) that are assumed to work as part of a security analysis

Example

- The TCB often includes
  - Correct function of the hardware (CPU and memory)
  - The low level boot code
  - The operating system (or at least parts of the operating system)
- Exercise
  - As you read the Princeton paper, consider what the TCB of the Diebold machine actually is
  - Could you make it smaller?

Policy and Mechanism

- Security Policy: A statement of what is, and what is not, allowed
- Security Mechanism: A method, tool, or procedure for enforcing a security policy

Goals of Security

- Prevention: Guarantee that an attack will fail
- Detection: Determine that a system is under attack, or has been attacked, and report it
- Recovery:
  - Off-line recovery: stop an attack, assess and repair damage
  - On-line recovery: respond to an attack reactively to maintain essential services

Assumptions

- Since the adversary or attacker is unconstrained, the security problem is always “open”
- Assumptions, either explicit or implicit, are the only constraints on the adversary

Trust

- Every system must trust something
- Trust is an underlying assumption
- To understand a system we must know what it trusts
- Typical examples of trusted entities:
  - We trust the system administrator to not abuse the ability to bypass mechanisms that enforce policy (e.g. access control)
  - We trust the hardware to behave as expected
Minimizing what we trust

• How little can we trust?
• If we trust the processor do we have to trust the boot loader?
• Can we verify that we have the expected operating system before executing it?

Assurance

• An attempt to quantify "how much" to trust a system
• Baseline:
  – What you expect it to do
  – Why you expect it to do that
    • Trust the process
    • Studied the artifact
    • Experience

Why do you trust an Airplane?

• Which of these do you trust more? Why?

Framework for Assurance

• Specification: What the system does
  – May be formal or informal
  – Says what, but not how
• Design: An approach to solving the problem; typically identifies components of the solution
  – Design satisfies specification if it does not permit implementations that violate the spec
  – Software design might include component communication and component specifications
• Implementation: A system satisfying the design (transitively the specification)
  • Software: Might be implementations of components described in design in a programming language

Operational Issues

• Policy and Mechanism must be appropriate for context
• Consider policy on vehicle keys in urban and rural settings
  – In urban settings you always take your keys; discourage joy riding/theft
  – In some rural settings people leave keys in vehicles so they are available to someone if they need to move (or use) the vehicle
• How do you make these decisions rationally?

Risk Analysis

• What is the likelihood of an attack?
  – Risk is a function of the environment
  – Risks change with time
  – Some risks are sufficiently remote to be "acceptable"
  – Avoid "analysis paralysis"
People

- Ultimately it is the system in use by people that must be secure
- If security mechanisms "are more trouble than they are worth" then users will circumvent them
- Security must be a value of the organization
- Policy and mechanism must be appropriate to the context as perceived by members of the organization

People as threat/weak link

- Insider threat
  - Release passwords
  - Release information
- Untrained personnel
  - Accidental insider threat
- Unheeded warnings
  - System administrators can fail to notice attacks, even if mechanisms report them
- User error
  - Even experts commit user error!
  - Misconfiguration is a significant risk

Conclusions

- Vocabulary for Security:
  - Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability
  - Threats and Attacks
  - Policy and Mechanism
  - Assumptions and Trust
  - Prevention, Detection, Recovery
  - Assurance
  - Operational issues: cost/benefit, risk
- Ultimate goal: A system used by people in an organization to achieve security goals appropriate to their situation

Next Lecture

- Format:
  - Next lecture will begin with a discussion section on the reading
  - Please be prepared to participate in the discussion
  - I will supply name tags
  - I will call on individuals

Next Lecture

- Voting Case Study and Access Control
- Reading:
  - Voting Discussion:
    - NY Times article on voting
    - Felten paper on Diebold voting machines
    - Anderson, Section 23.5 [Bleeding edge: Elections]
    - Freedom to Tinker blog on voting
  - Access Control
    - Anderson Chapter 1, particularly 1.7
    - Anderson Sections 4.1 and 4.2