

How to Evolve Safe Control Strategies

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Abstract

Autonomous space vehicles need adaptive control strategies that can accommodate unanticipated environmental conditions. The evaluation of new strategies can often be done only by actually trying them out in the real physical environment. Consequently, a candidate control strategy must be deemed safe—i.e., it won't damage any systems—prior to being tested online. How to do this efficiently has been a challenging problem.

We propose using evolutionary programming in conjunction with a formal verification technique (called model checking) to evolve candidate control strategies that are guaranteed to be safe for implementation and evaluation.

1. Introduction

Control strategies are critical ingredients of a space mission because they indicate what actions are to be taken by the spacecraft in response to environmental conditions. Unfortunately, control strategies defined at the beginning of a mission may have to be modified later on. The need for this modification may be due to system failures that reduce functionality or because the spacecraft has encountered unanticipated environmental conditions.

An appealing method for dealing with these undesirable situations is to use a *reconfigurable system*, which can adopt a different functionality. For example, a reconfigurable system eliminates the need for redundant hardware—which consumes precious space and weight—by simply modifying the existing hardware to compensate for the failure. However, despite the enormous advantages of reconfiguration, reconfiguration information originating from Earth will probably not arrive in time to do any good.

The real solution lies with *adaptive systems*—i.e., systems capable of self-reconfiguration in response to faults or

a changing operational environment [1]. This adaption is performed *in-situ* (in place), thereby removing any reliance on Earth-bound resources for reconfiguration information.

In this paper we propose a method for evolving new control strategies in a way guaranteed to be safe during the reconfiguration process. Our method fully supports *in-situ* adaption of the strategies.

2. Discussion

Control strategies can be evolved *extrinsically*, where each strategy is simulated, but only the best one is actually implemented, or *intrinsically*, where each candidate strategy is downloaded into the system and exercised in the real physical environment. *In-situ* extrinsic evolution may be problematic because some closed-form objective function is necessary to assess efficacy, but it may not always be possible to define a suitable one. Thus, in most cases intrinsic evolution may be the only thing that makes sense. It is therefore absolutely essential that the control strategy be safe—i.e., it does no harm to the controller itself nor to any other system. This safety check must be made prior to testing the new strategy online.

Our approach is to evolve a series of deterministic *finite state machines* (FSMs), each encoding a potential new control strategy. *Evolutionary programming* (EP) [5] is used to evolve these FSMs. The suitability of each strategy will be assessed by actually trying it in the real physical environment. However, only control strategies that pass a safety check will be downloaded for evaluation. We will borrow automatic formal verification methods to assess this safety. These methods use mathematically provable techniques to characterize a system without conducting exhaustive simulation or testing. Specifically, we will rely on *model checking* (MC) techniques [3] to verify the safety of candidate FSMs generated by EP. Although model checking has been extensively used in hardware design and software verification, to the best of our knowledge no prior research effort in formal methods has attempted the problem we consider

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here.

MC is a formal method that verifies if a system, modelled as a FSM, adheres to a specified property. The properties of interest are encoded as temporal logic expressions, which expresses properties that change over time [4]. There are many different kinds of temporal logic but *computation tree logic* (CTL) is the most widely used with model checkers. The basic idea is a safety property is expressed in ordinary Boolean logic, and then special temporal operators are added for describing future events.

MC has been used to verify properties in systems with hundreds of thousands of states. In practice, control strategies tend to have orders of magnitude fewer states. The MC algorithm complexity is linear in the size of the FSM and in the length of the CTL expression [2], so the safety of a control strategy can be quickly verified. A graphical representation of the MC algorithm is shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. A graphical depiction of the model checking algorithm. The control strategy is described by a FSM. I is the set of all FSM initial states and Y_0 is the set of FSM states that violates a safety property. The algorithm recursively computes $Y_{i+1} = \text{Pre}(Y_i) \cup Y_i$ for $i = 0, 1, 2, \dots, n-1$ where $\text{Pre}(Y_i)$ is the preimage of the set Y_i . Y_n then represents the set of all FSM states that can reach an error state. The system is safe if $Y_n \cap I = \emptyset$. This check can be done in linear time.

Several important issues concerning using MC to check safeness of control strategies are worth highlighting:

- *The large number of states in physical systems often forces one to use a reduced FSM model where some details are abstracted out. Model checking cannot guarantee safety under these circumstances.*

In our approach the EP algorithm renders FSMs which are complete in the sense that every aspect of the control strategy is explicitly described in the FSM structure. No details are abstracted out or reduced so the safety check results are guaranteed.

- *Model checkers typically provide trace information to help pinpoint where the safety property failed.*

We will not use this feature. In fact, we treat the entire safety issue as a decision problem—i.e., either the strategy is safe or it is not. Unsafe control strategies are immediately discarded, so there is no need to know why it is unsafe.

- *Model checkers are used to verify functional specifications and other properties, e.g., liveness.*

In our approach model checking only verifies safety. All other performance criteria are assessed by trying out the control strategy in the physical environment.

3. Implementation Details

Our method can be summarized as follows:

- Control strategies are encoded with FSMs.
- An EP algorithm generates candidate control strategies by evolving FSMs. EP is ideally suited for this task [5].
- Safety properties are encoded as CTL expressions.
- A symbolic model checker accepts the FSM and CTL expressions as input, and quickly checks to see if the control strategy is safe. The correctness of the safety check is guaranteed.
- Safe control strategies are evaluated in the physical environment whereas unsafe strategies are discarded.
- The EP algorithm runs a fixed number of generations or terminates sooner if a suitable control strategy is found. The best performing FSM is implemented as the new control strategy.

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